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This article studies the institutional changes of Slovenian capitalism that have taken place 
since the post-2007/2008 crisis by exploring the impact of internationalisation of the Slovenian 
state apparatuses under the Eurozone regime on the restructuring of Slovenian neo-
corporatism. A theoretical framework combining the labour-centred approach to capitalist 
development, the neo-Poulantzasian debate on neoliberal internationalisation of states and 
Latin American dependency theory is used. A political economy of the Slovenian institutional 
dynamics before and after the crisis is proposed. Whereas the importance of external and 
internal constraints to the post-2008 policy shift has been acknowledged, the rescaling and 
remodelling of Slovenian state regulations in line with the Eurozone regime and the 
consequent uneven restructuring of the capacities of various local social forces to influence 
decision-making process have been underestimated. One should go beyond the dichotomist 
understanding of institutional change in terms of continuity and change to integrate the 
question of power relations between social forces and institutions representing them. 
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1. Introduction 
This contribution examines the changing role of the state in national economies by 
discussing the institutional changes of Slovenian capitalism that have taken place 
since the post-2007/2008 crisis. As various accounts point out, the crisis revealed 
more than some internal weakness in the Slovenian pre-crisis growth regime (Bohle–
Greskovitz 2012, Myant–Drahokoupil 2011). By 2010, it also became clear that the 
country barely resembled a regional social-democratic outlier, as (at least until 
recently) the widely accepted assertion would have it: a strong erosion of corporatist 
and democratic policy making (Bohle–Greskovitz 2012, Guardiancich 2012, 
Krašovec–Johannsen 2016, Stanojević et al. 2016), extreme government instability 
and the radicalisation of political leaders’ agendas with regard to EU policy directives 
(Bembič 2013, Lindstrom 2015, Stanojević 2014) are some of the characteristics 
commonly associated with Slovenian policy-making during the crisis. Finally, 
between 2010 and 2014, substantial structural reforms were implemented, leading 
scholars to question the future of Slovenian “exceptionalism” (Guardiancich 2016, 
Lindstrom 2015, Stanojević et al. 2016,). These developments were alternately 
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attributed to the country’s reluctance to engage in liberal reforms in the past, and its 
“oversized” communist heritage (Bugaric–Kuhelj 2015, Guardiancich 2016); the so-
called “neoliberal” post-2004 turn of the Janša administration, which impaired neo-
corporatist decision-making (Bohle–Greskovitz 2012) as well as to pressures from the 
EU and financial markets (Stanojević et al. 2016). 
This analysis aims to contribute to the existing debate on the post 2007/08 
dynamics of Slovenian capitalism by considering the country’s membership in the 
Eurozone and exploring the impact of internationalisation of the Slovenian state 
apparatuses under the Eurozone regime on the restructuring of Slovenian neo-
corporatism. Since the mid-2000s the latter entered a period of significant change, 
which only accelerated during the crisis. Since 2010, a various set of regulatory 
packages have been implemented at the European level that further narrowed member 
states’ capacities to manage the crisis politically and economically. By deepening the 
crisis hardship and transferring the main burden of adjustment on labour social 
welfare, this regime accelerated the internal reshuffling of Slovenian neo-corporatism, 
led by internal devaluation constraints. 
The argument unfolds in three steps. First, a theoretical framework is proposed. 
Then, the discussion focuses on the establishment and erosion of a labour-centred neo-
corporatism before the crisis. In the last part, political and institutional developments 
during the crisis are explored. 
2. Theoretical background: The labour-focused international political 
economy and the centre-periphery relations within the EU 
Though distancing itself from theoretical underpinnings of the dominant approach on 
the diversity of post-socialist capitalism(s), the proposed theoretical framework draws 
from insights highlighted in the debate on the shortcomings of the VoC paradigm. 
There are three aspects of post-socialist institutional change that an alternative 
framework should contain: the role of labour within conflictual industrial relations 
(Crowley–Stanojević 2011, Hardy 2015), the importance of international actors, 
especially the EU (Bohle–Greskovits 2007, Bluhm 2010), and the dependent form of 
international integration (Myant–Drahokoupil 2011, Nölke–Vliegenthart 2009). For 
these reasons, the proposed alternative theoretical framework builds on three 
perspectives: the labour-centred approach to capitalist development, the neoliberal 
internationalisation of states and Latin American dependency theory. 
2.1. Labour-centred approach to studying institutional change in a capitalist 
economy 
Building on Poulantzas’s state theory, Selwyn (2014) highlights that states are not 
closed “containers” but embody various networks of institutions and agencies, 
themselves in conflictual relations. State institutions should be understood as 
outcomes of prior and on-going struggles between labour, capital and state over the 
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organisation of production and redistribution of the produced value. Consequently, 
the concrete state form and related hierarchy of state apparatuses are inherently 
precarious (Hirsch–Kannankulam 2010, p. 17). “[T]he state itself is mutable to the 
extent that struggles by different classes and fractions of capital, and the outcome of 
these struggles, are constitutive processes in state institutional formation and 
reproduction” (Selwyn 2011, p. 11). 
The role of labour in shaping state institutions should be particularly taken into 
account as “[i]ndustrial relations is the core battleground in the clash between capital 
and labour at the very heart of the value creating process that gives capitalism its 
profits, its dynamism and its inexorable requirement to expand” (Coates 2014, p. 26). 
Analysing the specificities of trade unions in the countries of the former Yugoslavia, 
which include Slovenia, it is useful to distinguish between the societal and political 
power of organized labour. “Societal power rests on such capacities as high trade 
union density (representativeness), the ability to organize public protests or the ability 
to sway public opinion. Political power rests on the ability to influence top-level 
decision-making through corporatist institutions, centralized bargaining, and the 
practice of social pacts” (Grdešić 2008, p. 145). 
The formation, articulation and reshaping of state apparatuses has spatial 
dimension as well. This is particularly true in the contemporary period when the 
neoliberal restructuring of capitalist production gave additional impetus to the re-
scaling of regulatory mechanisms below and above state level, and reconfigured 
institutionalised structures of regulation and agency that were set up in a context of 
post-war Fordism (Brenner 1999, pp. 60–67). The so-called “internationalisation of 
state” does not imply, however, a diminution of states. Instead, what is at stake is the 
transformation of “the role of states in making markets and shaping market 
relationship” (Panitch–Gindin 2012, p. 105) and the creation of “a system of states 
prepared to follow the neoliberal agenda of economic deregulation, privatization, and 
securing property.” (Hirsch–Kannankulam 2010, p. 26). 
The reconfiguration of state apparatuses is also impacted by the fragmentation of 
world markets and unequal structuration of the international state system. The global 
process of accumulation could be seen as a result of different and unequal means of 
national accumulation and regulations, and is based on the possibility of playing one 
off against the other (Hirsch 2013, p. 77). As Bruszt and Greskovits (2009) highlight, 
in Latin America’s dependency school, Cardoso and Faletto’s historical structural 
approach (1979) is seen as particularly valuable, as it seeks to understand the 
“variability of the forms of integration on the world markets” (Cardoso 2009 in Bruszt 
and Greskovits 2009, p. 412) by exploring changing constraints, mechanisms and 
structures of dependency relations (see also Becker et al. 2015). The development 
process in central economies structures and dominates the development at the 
periphery, contributing to different forms of national development. Production taking 
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place in core and periphery takes structurally asymmetrical, yet interdependent and 
unequal forms and macroeconomic characteristics that are historically determined.  
Nevertheless, arguing against the mechanist view of dependency relations 
defended by Frank (1966), Cardoso and Faletto (1979) do not simply regard 
dependence as an external variable. Although the limits for manoeuvring are largely 
set by the world system, the particular internal configuration of a country determines 
a specific response to the same external events. The composition of the ruling bloc 
can be much more complex and depends on particular socio-economic structure. 
External interests can be internalised by peripheral state and civil society, with no 
explicit external pressure. Therefore, the relationship between the representatives of 
foreign and national capital can take different forms, from strategic coalitions to 
partial conflict (Cardoso–Faletto 1979, p. xvi). To contrast Frank’s (1966) 
“development of under-development” thesis, and to emphasize that the forms of 
dependence are not permanent and that some of them are compatible with local 
industrialisation, Cardoso (1972, p. 90) introduces the concept of “dependent 
capitalist development”. 
2.2. The internationalisation of post-socialist states 
The following discussion attempts to outline the main particularities of the 
internationalisation of post-socialist states in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). It is 
widely acknowledged that Washington-based agencies (IMF and WB) and the EU 
have played prominent roles in the development of capitalism and national states’ 
regulatory regimes in CEE. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, by tightening its 
financial assistance, the IMF could effectively exercise “hard” power to achieve 
structural reforms which were part of the Washington Consensus strategy, in 
particularly in those countries that had “inherited” a considerable debt burden from 
their socialist regimes. 
As far as the EU is concerned, the formal links with post-socialist states developed 
after 1993 with the so-called Association Agreements. In contrast to the IMF, the 
efforts of the EU concerned a much broader agenda of political, economic, and 
institutional changes. Nevertheless, during the accession period, the EU particularly 
focused on the improvement of the quality of the regulatory framework related to 
economic policy and organisation, and, by doing so, it indirectly shaped local 
arrangements in the social area. Moreover, accession to the EU required the 
elimination of control on the cross-border movement of capital; the countries were 
required to enter the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), and to introduce the 
European common currency (Myant–Drahokoupil 2011).  
Given the fact that Slovenia adopted the euro in 2007, as the first among the EU 
post-socialist members to enter the Eurozone, EMU regulatory constraints should be 
considered as well. The EMU regime, codified in the Maastricht Treaty, The Stability 
and Growth Pact, and the Lisbon Treaty, consists of a set of rules that significantly 
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impact member states’ capacities and economic policies. Five of them are particularly 
important. Firstly, while fiscal policy was essentially national policy, it was, however, 
restricted to the short term, with budget deficits not to exceed 3% of GDP. Secondly, 
monetary policy was centralized at the EU level with the European Central Bank 
(ECB) effectively targeting inflation close to or below 3%. Thirdly, the financial 
markets were liberalised, and until recently, no-bail out clause prevailed, i.e. neither 
national government nor the ECB could help a country in financial difficulties. 
Finally, within the EMU economic policy regime, internal devaluation became the 
prime mechanism of adjustment to external shocks. Since standard economic tools 
were paralysed “labour markets are supposed to be flexible. The European 
Commission and the ECB regard wage flexibility as the cure for economic 
imbalances. By this they mean downward wage flexibility […] The burden of 
adjustment has thus to be carried by the labour market and wage policy” 
(Stockhammer–Köhler 2015, p. 38).  
However, preceding the crisis, member states maintained considerable residual 
sovereignty over the implementation of EMU rules concerning fiscal policies and the 
extent of labour market liberalisation; they varied considerably across the region, in 
line with local socio-economic structures, struggles and compromises achieved 
(Lapavitsas 2012). With the unfolding of the Eurozone crisis, however, the EU 
adopted a set of legislative packages, known as “new European economic 
governance”, which enabled European policy, to “step by step, tighten[ed] its grip” 
(Schulten–Müller 2015, p. 332) on national policy areas that were previously confined 
to the national “negotiation arena”.  
With respect to the binding character of new policy directives, Schulten and 
Müller (2015) distinguish two main channels of EU intervention. The country-specific 
recommendations issued each year since 2010 within European Semester cycles have 
not been legally binding; nevertheless, following the 2011 Six-Pack provisions, 
member states can be issued a fine if the “corrective action” is not implemented 
properly. Secondly, more binding mechanisms concerning the “quid pro quo of 
reforms for financial support” (Schulten–Müller 2015, p. 337) were laid down 
between individual countries and the Troika (the EU Commission, the ECB and the 
IFM).  
The tightening of the Euro regime had crucial implications for the policy 
manoeuvring of member states during the crisis. Fiscal and monetary restrictions 
limited, if not prevented, the ability to counter the crisis with expansionary fiscal 
policies, while the separation of fiscal and monetary policy exposed countries to 
pressures from financial markets (Stockhammer–Köhler 2015). A similar impact was 
also produced by the EU competition and state aid restrictions that ruled out help to 
individual industrial enterprises (Myant et al. 2013) and preconditioned the approval 
for state aid to financial institutions with the restructuring of troubled enterprises, 
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where privatisation was seen as the best possible option (Taškar Beloglavec–Taškar 
Beloglavec 2014). 
Moreover, the “euro-led” restructuring of state apparatuses reshaped the decision-
making process. The established mechanisms granted substantial powers to the EU 
executive and the ECM at the expense of democratically elected bodies, and increased 
their interference in the macroeconomic policy of member states (Keucheyan–Durand 
2015). The new regulations also tended to reconfigure power relations between the 
EU and a member state, as well as between national apparatuses within individual 
states (Oberndorfer 2015). The deepening of the European integration in the name of 
financial stability and the euro unevenly reshaped the capacities of local social and 
political forces, and their institutional representatives, to impact the local policy-
making process. While the executive institutions and those linked to finance were 
strengthened and accorded the right of policy-making, the institutions defending 
social rights, protection and equality were weakened and institutionally reduced to 
“policy-taking” (cf. Keucheyan–Durand 2015, p. 42). “Increasing encroachment on 
the procedures of formal democracy and the rule of law […] are intended to place the 
European ensemble of state apparatuses […] of which the national executives are part, 
in a position to chip away the social rights that are still anchored in the national legal 
systems” (Oberndorfer 2015, pp. 202–203). 
3. Slovenian neo-corporatism before the crisis: Emergence and destabilisation 
The particular institutional and macroeconomic trajectory of Slovenian capitalism 
before the crisis is widely acknowledged, as well as a considerable weakening of the 
established system after 2004. The following lines argue that these developments are 
best understood by taking into consideration the (changing) influence of organized 
labour and the extent of the internationalisation of the Slovenian state. 
3.1. Labour pressures and Slovenian neo-corporatist gradualism 
Slovenia is widely known for its gradualist approach to macroeconomic stabilisation 
during the transition and its neo-corporatist regime, which both proved to be rather 
exceptional in the CEE region (Bohle–Greskovitz 2012, Rojec et al. 2004). 
Notwithstanding the importance of historical legacies and favourable initial 
macroeconomic conditions, two factors were particularly important for the peculiar 
path of Slovenian capitalism: the power of the organized labour and the relatively 
small degree of internationalisation of the Slovenian state. As a consequence of 
favourable debt negotiation with the IMF and international lenders after secession, the 
country was not obliged to seek financial assistance from international creditors 
(Lindstrom–Piroska 2007). 
The establishment of the institutional infrastructure of Slovenian capitalism took 
place in a period of intense social conflict. In a context of high inflation (approaching 
200 percent per year, SORS), real wage increases became unsustainable and were a 
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source of major concern to employers (especially exporters) and the DEMOS 
government (Crowley–Stanojević 2011, Feldmann 2014). In 1992, when the 
government decided to freeze wages and suspend collective agreements as 
unemployment stood at 12% (SORS), the main union federation Zveza svobodnih 
sindikatov Slovenije organized a massive warning strike that practically paralyzed the 
country for a few hours, and this evolved into a quite exceptional wave of strikes, 
which was maintained through the year (Crowley–Stanojević 2011).  
Indeed, the strength of organized labour impacted the trajectory of Slovenian 
capitalism in many ways. Politically, it helped remove the unstable DEMOS coalition 
from power, resulting in the twelve-year rule of the centre-left government coalition 
that considered Yugoslav heritage a valuable asset and was consequently reluctant to 
sell national enterprises to foreign investors (Bandelj 2004, Lindstrom–Piroska 2007, 
Mencinger 2004). Institutionally, it pushed the government to adopt a method of 
privatisation in the interests of insiders, while the state became the majority owner of 
larger, capital-intensive companies. After the strike wave, the government abandoned 
the wage freeze and accepted the unions’ proposal to manage inflation via centralized 
collective bargaining in the shape of the 1994 Economic and Social council, the main 
institution of the Slovenian system of social dialogue (Crowley–Stanojević 2011). 
Finally, Bembič (2013) outlines how organized labour also impacted the policy of the 
Bank of Slovenia – a fixed exchange rate regime was politically unacceptable, as it 
would result in direct confrontation with a strong labour movement. According to 
Lindstrom and Piroska (2007), the Central Bank of Slovenia during the 1990s chose 
a floating exchange rate in order to protect domestic industries and maintain a low 
current account deficit, thus acting as a kind of a “social partner” (Greskovits 2009). 
This does not imply that the Slovenian government did not try to de-regulate the 
established system. When, in the second half of the decade, negotiations with the EU 
started, the government used the accession process as an opportunity to privatise the 
pension system; at which the unions organized a mass rally with over 20,000 
participants in March 1998, repeating the action a year later. The government was 
forced to reconsider its proposal and to adopt a significantly softer version of the 
pension system reform (Stanojević 2011). During the 1990s “Slovenia was the most 
strike-prone country in eastern Central Europe: the volume of strikes (or working days 
lost per 1,000 employees) in those years was ninety-two in Slovenia, compared to 
twenty-one elsewhere in Eastern Europe” (Crowley–Stanojević 2011, p. 278). 
Thus, the pressures for organised labour and a relatively autonomous policy-
making space were the main political factors ensuring “a relatively competitive and 
simultaneously internally integrated system during the entire period of Slovenia’s 
preparation for membership of the EU and the Eurozone” (Stanojević 2014, p. 104). 
The country has been widely recognized as being a CEE leader in its drive for 
capitalist accumulation (Bohle–Greskovitz 2012), and this without undermining 
social equality and becoming dependent on international investors, either in the 
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banking or corporate sector, as was the case with many other post-socialist countries 
(see Figure 1 and 2). Finally, the Slovenian state channelled the highest share of its 
GDP to social protection in the region; while the poverty rate barely increased, from 
13.6% in 1993 to 13.8% in 1998, and remained below the EU-18 average of 18% 
(IMAD 2002). 
 
3.2. Euro-led rescaling of Slovenian state apparatuses and changing power balance 
In 2004/2005 the rescaling of Slovenian state apparatuses in line with the 
requirements of EU accession and the ERMII regime provoked the first major turning 
Figure 1 Net FDI stock, CEE countries, 1997-2007 average, % of GDP 
 
Source: UNCTAD 
Figure 2 Market share of foreign-owned banks, Slovenia and Visegrád countries, 
2001-2007 average, % of total assets 
 
Source: Raiffeisen CEE Banking Sector Report 2004, 2008, 2014. 
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point in the development of Slovenian capitalism, both in terms of its growth model 
and institutional set-up. The state abolished protectionist measures and control of 
(financial) capital flows, and lost its exchange rate mechanism (external devaluation) 
and control over monetary policy (Kržan 2014). The implications of this change for 
the structural weakening of organized labour were all the more pronounced as the 
country’s entry in the EU coincided with a change in government, bringing a centre-
right wing coalition to power. At the beginning of its mandate, the government 
proposed a package of radical reforms, including a flat tax rate, justifying it with the 
country’s accommodation into the Eurozone. The trade unions organised the largest 
public protest in the history of the country, joined by around 40,000 workers. The 
government promptly abandoned the proposed tax reforms but nevertheless succeeded 
in implementing other measures, though more gradually (Leskošek–Dragoš 2014, 
Stanojević 2014). The post-2004 restructuring of the state had three important 
implications for Slovenian industrial relations and the manner of its international 
integration. 
Intensified pressures from international competition and the increasing 
indebtedness of corporate sector further destabilized the “competitive solidarity” 
pattern within enterprises. Meanwhile, the growing discontent of workers fuelled 
interest fragmentation and the radicalisation of trade unions, which now faced 
collapsing membership. After 2004, the unions lost almost one quarter of their 
membership, standing at 26% in 2008 (Stanojević et al. 2016). At the same time, after 
the fixing of the tolar to the euro and the consequent transfer of monetary policy to 
the European level, the coordination of wage setting and national macroeconomic 
policy became less important (Feldmann 2014). In fact, in 2006, the government 
decided to abolish mandatory membership of the main employer organisation; faced 
with falling membership, their representatives radicalised their stances and 
increasingly turned towards individual firm-based industrial relations (Bohle–
Greskovitz 2012). Following the reforms of labour market, tax system and welfare 
state, state expenditures on social security decreased by over 3 percentage point to 
21.4% of GDP in 2007, and the at-risk-of-poverty rate after social transfer increased 
by over 2 percentage point to 12.3% between 2004 and 2008 (SI-STAT 2017). 
Moreover, the Bank of Slovenia transformed from being a “social” to a “financial” 
partner. Once the country gained access to the cheap credits that damaged European 
markets after the euro launch, the loan-to-GDP ratio of domestic banks more than 
doubled from around 40% of GDP in 2003 to close to 90% in 2008 (OECD 2013) as 
a result of the explosion of foreign indebtedness in the corporate sector. As Figure 3 
shows, up to 2005, the Slovenian economy had assumed the position of a net creditor; 
but during the following three years, net external debt exploded to represent more than 
a third of the wealth produced in 2008 (34% of GDP). The credit growth was the most 
rapid in 2006 and 2007 period, when rising inflation further reduced the real interest 
rates in Slovenia in comparison to other euro area countries (Bank of Slovenia 2015). 
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Though the growth in credit was the most intense in banks with majority foreign 
ownership (Bank of Slovenia 2015), domestic banks, which still had predominant 
market shares at home market, were much more exposed to corporate failure (Kržan 
2013). 
The changing balance of social power within the Slovenian state apparatuses also 
manifested itself on the macroeconomic level with a shift in the growth model from 
export-led industrialisation in favour of domestic capitalists towards a credit-fuelled 
overheating of the economy, driven by an intense investment activity (Becker–Jäger 
2012, Kržan 2014, Ponikvar et al. 2014). Though the largest share of foreign credit 
was used for erroneous over-investment in core business activities in all sectors of the 
economy, indebtedness increased most rapidly in cyclical sectors, like construction, 
real estate and financial holdings. Moreover, cheap credit was also used to finance a 
new wave of ownership centralisation led by manager-leveraged buy outs (Kržan 
2014). 
Crucially, the inflows of foreign finance did not lead to any significant 
technological breakthrough or improved productivity, but instead increased the 
vulnerability of the Slovenian economy to external shocks (Ponikvar et al. 2014). 
Rapidly increasing inflation, fuelled by the pre-crisis economic boom, undermined 
the price competitiveness of the Slovenian economy. In fact, since the mid-2000s, 
analysists have started to warn about the structural weakness of Slovenian 
manufacturing, manifested among other things in slower growth of market shares in 
comparison to benchmark economies (Rojec et al. 2004), but also in the 
destabilisation of the “competitive solidarity pattern” in enterprises, which used work 
intensification as its main adjustment to external pressures (Stanojević 2012).  
Thus, although the institutional framework of the economy was formally 
preserved, after 2004 the “Slovenian industrial relations model was already exposed 
to intensive, significant pressures and changes” (Stanojević et al. 2016, p. 4). As seen 
Figure 3 Net external debt, Slovenia, 1995-2012, % of GDP 
 
Source: Eurostat (2017) 
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now, the crisis only accelerated the underlying pressures: instead of reducing the 
economic meltdown, a tightened Eurozone regulation not only weakened the 
Slovenian state’s capacities to stabilise economic activity, and exposed the country to 
pressures from financial markets, but also heightened social tensions over policy 
measures. 
4. The neo-corporatist restructuring following authoritarian and competitive 
anti-Keynesianism 
Slovenia was severely hit during the recent crisis: between 2008 and 2015, the country 
experienced one of the biggest economic declines of the CEE region, well beyond the 
EU-19 and the EU-28 average (Eurostat 2017, see also Table 1). Moreover, in contrast 
to many other states, the initial crisis of the “real economy” evolved into a serious 
crisis of the banking sector and of sovereign debt. The outbreak of the crisis brought 
to the forefront of public attention the precariousness of the country’s pre-crisis 
growth, and the necessity of structural changes (Bohle–Greskovitz 2012). However, 
by promoting an export-led model in favour of foreign investors and exhibiting a 
strong anti-Keynesian demand management bias, the chosen “anti-crisis” policy 
program mostly accelerated the rehierarchisation of the Slovenian state apparatuses, 
following a pattern of “authoritarian competitive statism” (Oberndorfer 2015, p. 185). 
4.1. Managing the crisis under an austeritarian regime 
For the greater part of the period studied, the political management of the crisis in 
Slovenia was characterised by the “austeritarian regime” (Lehendorff 2015, p. 11), 
according to which the austerity measures and structural reforms seeking to reducing 
labour costs went hand-in-hand with increasingly authoritarian rule. The last quarter 
of 2008 marked the proper beginning of a crisis in the Slovenian economy, with GDP 
growth going down by 1.2% (OECD 2015). A decline in foreign demand and the 
emerging liquidity strain provoked a pronounced contraction in manufacturing and 
construction. The emergence of the crisis in Slovenia in late 2008 coincided with a 
change in government, bringing a centre-left coalition to power. Following the 
European Recovery program, the government initially implemented various fiscal 
packages that sought to alleviate the shock of a plummeting external demand and 
financial sources (Tajnikar–Bonča 2015). However, when the country entered the 
excessive deficit procedure in 2010 and was henceforth under observation within the 
European Semester cycles, the government performed a strategic U-turn; though the 
crisis was neither caused nor driven by problems related to fiscal (in)solvency or 
excessive labour costs (Bole 2012a, Tajnikar–Bonča 2015), the Slovenian government 
made fiscal consolidation and the improvement of (price) competitiveness the 
cornerstone of the Slovenian Exit Strategy 2010-2013 (Government of the Republic 
of Slovenia 2010). 
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This “ambitious program of structural reforms” (OECD 2013, p. 11) comprised 
the introduction of a fiscal rule; the liberalisation of the pension system and 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises; a decrease in taxes on labour and the 
reorganisation of the social security system in line with workfare principles, as well 
as a mini-jobs reform copying the German system (Government of the Republic of 
Slovenia 2010). The planned fiscal consolidation was not only strongly digressive, 
privileging higher-income groups while directly affecting the living standards of low 
and middle income social strata, but was also pro-cyclical: in the context of rapidly 
expanding unemployment together with domestic banks highly exposed to corporate 
failure, it would have been more appropriate to favour fiscal expansionary policy 
instead of expansionary austerity (Bole 2012a, Senjur 2012).  
This policy shift took place in a period of intense labour protests. Throughout 
2009, a wave of spontaneous strikes progressively intensified, culminating in 
November 2009 with the staging of a massive rally. After the protest, the government 
agreed to increase the minimum wage by almost 23%, partially to appease the workers 
and partially to gain union approval for its planned reforms of the pension system and 
labour market (Stanojević et al. 2016). However, the negotiations between 
institutional partners over the pension system and labour market reforms broke down 
irremediably (Guardiancich 2012), and the government decided to implement both 
reforms unilaterally (Stanojević 2014).  
This move pushed the entire “Keynesian electorate” to the opposition: public 
sector unions organized the biggest strike in the history of the independent state, 
involving about 80,000 workers, and joined private sector unions in promoting a 
massive referendum campaign against legislative changes (Stanojevic–Klaric 2013). 
The government now called upon the Constitutional Court to assess whether the 
pension reform was unconstitutional (Feldmann 2014). The Court, however, refused 
the government’s demand, and in spring 2011, both reforms were rejected by the 
populace and withdrawn from the legislation schedule. Slovenia found itself in a 
serious political crisis: the government suffered a vote of no-confidence and, for the 
first time in the history of the independent state, early elections took place, bringing 
the centre-right coalition back into power in early 2012 (Stanojević et al. 2016). 
The change in government coincided with a significant degradation of the 
Slovenian economy, and this despite the fact that as early as in 2010, improved foreign 
Table 1 Economic performance, Slovenia, selected indicators, 2007-2014, in % 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
GDP growth 6,9 3,3 -7,8 1,2 0,6 -2,7 -1,1 3 
Government debt/GDP 22,8 21,8 34,6 38,4 46,6 53,9 71 81 
Government deficit/GDP 0,1 1,4 5,9 5,6 6,7 4,1 15 5 
Unemployment rate 4,9 4,4 5,9 7,3 8,2 8,9 10,1 9,7 
Current account balance/GDP -4,1 -5,3 -0,6 -0,1 0,2 2,6 4,8 6,2 
Source: SI-STAT (2017) and Eurostat (2017) 
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demand had been leading the Slovenian export manufacture towards recovery 
(Myant–Drahokoupil 2011): unemployment, standing at 8% in late 2011, had almost 
doubled since the outbreak of the crisis, the unresolved problems of corporate-banking 
debt led to a rapid growth in non-performing loans on bank portfolios, standing at 
over 19% of GDP in 2012 (Kržan 2014, OECD 2013), while the ECB status (see 
above) and turmoil in the Eurozone had sent Slovenia’s costs of borrowing upwards, 
though public debt remained below Maastricht criteria and fiscal solvency was above 
the EU average (Bole 2012a, Kržan 2013). The new government now centralised 
policy decision-making in the finance ministry (Mekina 2012b); the new program 
combining a foreign-led restructuring of the corporate and banking sectors with 
drastic austerity measures intended to bring the public deficit from 6.7% to below 3% 
of GDP in a year (Government of the Republic of Slovenia 2012, p. 23). In addition, 
by the end of the year the government amended over 100 laws under the ‘fast track’ 
costumes procedure (Mekina 2012b).  
Meanwhile, the proposed reform package and the authoritarian ruling had sparked 
anger in the local population. The public trade unions organised another general strike 
and urged the government to moderate its proposed budgetary cuts (Stanojevic–Klaric 
2013). Several calls for a referendum against the proposed measures were made by 
trade unions and members of opposition groups. Whereas the unions’ calls were 
dismissed by methods on the limits of legality (Dnevnik 2012), the demands of the 
opposition were reviewed by the Constitutional Court at the request of the 
government. This time, the Court considered a referendum would be unconstitutional 
(Pistotnik–Živčič 2015). The Court’s decision came at the very peak of the so-called 
Slovenian “winter of discontent”, the biggest civil society movement since the 
country’s independence (Stanojević et al. 2016, p. 5).  
During the winter of 2012/2013, a constructive no-vote took place, and a new 
centre-left coalition was formed. By now, mostly as a result of the “austeritarian” 
drive, the country found itself “in a typical crisis of fast indebtedness of the 
government sector and negative economic growth. This has created conditions that 
have been proper for almost all countries of the European south” (Tajnikar–Došenović 
Bonča 2015, p. 757, see also Bole 2012b, pp. 7–8). After the Cyprus crisis, when 
Slovenian government bonds spiked at close to 7% (Eurostat 2017), the international 
press again speculated whether the country would become “The next domino?” (The 
Economist 2013) While the third “crisis” government did succeed in sheltering the 
country from the poisoned chalice of Troika assistance, this was achieved at the 
expense of social rights and democratic procedures.  
By the middle of the year, further cuts in public expenditure and labour market 
reform had been implemented. The Parliament approved the constitutionalisation of 
the “golden fiscal rule”, restricted referendum legislation, and thus “removed a 
powerful tool from the trade unions to combat anti-labour proposals” (Stanojević et 
al. 2016, p. 6), and launched the procedures for the privatisation of state owned 
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enterprises. In June 2013, i.e. during the annual period of revision of national reform 
programs by EU institutions, the EU Commission and the ECB blocked the 
governments’ action of bank recapitalisation and the transfer of non-performing loans 
to bad banks, and demanded new stress tests (Breznik–Furlan 2015, Council of the 
EU 2013).  
The operation resulted not only in much higher estimation of the total capital 
needs of the banks at 10% of GDP, and increased public debt almost half to 71% of 
GDP; Slovenian authorities also, rapidly and without public debate, modified banking 
capital legislation and insolvency procedures (Mencinger et al. 2014). As a 
prerequisite to the approval of state aid, the government committed to fully privatise 
two, mainly state-owned banks (NKBM and Abanka) after their recapitalisation, and 
to reduce state ownership in the largest, mainly state-owned bank to 25% plus one 
share in the medium term (DC ECOFIN 2014, for information on exact state aid 
decision see Taškar Beloglavec–Taškar Beloglavec 2014).  
Losing all legitimacy and credibility, the Bratušek administration resigned in 
early 2014, less than a year after it had assumed power. By 2014, more than 90% of 
the population was dissatisfied with the state of democracy, while prior to the crisis, 
this figure represented half of the population (Krašovec–Johannsen 2016). And while 
by 2014, the crisis seemed to be pacified, the recovery was mostly driven by exports 
and heightened dependency on foreign demand. Between 2007 and 2015, the share of 
exports in GDP increased from 67% to 79%, and investment (measured as fixed 
capital formation) went down from 30% to 15%, reaching its lowest point since the 
exit of the Slovenian economy from the “transformation depression” of the early 
1990s (SI-STAT 2017). A rather depressed domestic demand was also a major factor 
behind the stabilisation of the balance-of-payments situation, allowing the country to 
accumulate unprecedented current account surpluses, standing at a stunning 6.2% of 
GDP in 2014 (Bole 2016, IMF 2016). At the same time, the country recorded an above 
EU-average rise in at-risk-of-poverty-rate during the crisis, going up from 12.3% in 
2008 to 14.5% in 2015. Among the post-socialist countries from the CEE region, only 
Hungary recorded a similar expansion in poverty (Eurostat 2017). To a large extent, 
the deterioration of living standards was related to the adopted structural reforms 
discussed below. 
4.2. Institutional reshuffling in favour of (price) competitiveness 
Though both organised labour and the state as the main regulator of Slovenian 
capitalism had been attacked to an unprecedented extent, the crisis failed to enfeeble 
either of them, and most resulting reforms were implemented with the agreement of 
social partners. Instead, the implemented reforms accelerated the already present trend 
of reshuffling Slovenian institutional infrastructure at the expense of the central role 
of labour in political and economic management. 
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In 2010, the reform of the social security system introduced means tested social 
transfers and subsidies. Social allowances were now attributed on the basis of income 
as well as property. Social work centres were reorganised and a new electronic system 
was established in order to ensure a better overview of the property and incomes of 
applicants for social support. (OECD 2013) The reform changed the Slovenian social 
security system in line with new welfare principles, meaning that benefits moved from 
being universal to targeted and conditional (Trbanc et al. 2016). The 2012 pension 
system reform raised the retirement age for both woman and men to 65 years, or after 
40 years of pensionable service, and introduced a restrictive pension indexation policy 
(IMAD 2016).  
By practically lowering the working standards of permanent workers to that of the 
casual workers, the 2013 labour market reform provoked one of the biggest decreases 
in the employment security index among OECD countries during the crisis (OECD 
2015). Slovenia currently has the biggest share of fixed-term youth contracts in the 
EU, representing over 80% of all contracts (IMAD 2016). In addition, the reform also 
introduced a new hierarchy in the system of collective bargaining by allowing more 
flexible arrangements at the company level. The recent practices have shown that this 
flexibility is mostly used to lower wage standards and working conditions. (Stanojević 
et al. 2016) 
A cross-sectorial Public Finance Balance Act, adopted in 2012, provided legal 
grounds for a restrictive fiscal policy (Pistotnik–Živčič 2015). As mentioned, a 
restrictive fiscal policy gained constitutional grounds in the middle of 2013, when the 
Parliament agreed to the introduction of the fiscal rule in the Constitution following 
the recommendations of the European fiscal pact. In 2015, constitutional changes 
were complemented with a Law on fiscal rule that operationalised the rule and 
prepared the institutional framework for the establishment of the Fiscal council 
(IMAD 2016). 
The reforms of labour welfare went hand-in-hand with the restructuring of the 
corporate governance system. In 2013 and 2014 the bad bank and sovereign state 
holding (SSH) were established and became institutional actors in the privatisation of 
state assets and selling of troubled enterprises. SSH, which centralises all state assets, 
resembles those that other post-socialist countries established at the beginning of the 
1990s (Mekina 2012a). In May 2013, the Parliament approved a list of enterprises to 
be privatised that included enterprises from the manufacturing sector and strategic 
ones, like airports, airlines and the major telecom provider. At the end of the year, as 
seen above, the state also committed itself to selling two state-owned banks and to 
reducing state ownership of the biggest national bank. (OECD 2015) The initial 
privatisation plan was formalised in 2015 with the adoption of the State Asset 
Management strategy. By April 2015, four companies and one bank were sold to 
foreign investors. According to the Institute for Macroeconomic Analysis and 
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Development, the FDI inflows amounted to EUR 1,447 million in 2014 and attained 
EUR 1,184.8 million between January and October 2015 (IMAD 2016).  
Finally, a word on changes in referendum legislation is in order. The 
constitutional amendments narrowed the scope of the issues that may constitute the 
object of a referendum, reduced the mechanisms enabling the call for a referendum 
and restricted the rules over the voting results. Referendums are no longer allowed to 
be called with respect to laws concerning fiscal issues (like laws on taxes, customs 
and other obligatory charges, or laws regulating the implementation of the central 
government budget); emergency measures regarding the security of the state, the 
ratification of international treaties, as well as laws that protect constitutionality in the 
area of human rights and fundamental freedoms (Pistotnik–Živčič 2015). 
Despite a significant wave of reform, Slovenian neo-corporatist structures, do in 
fact remain in place and social dialogue has not vanished. However, as Stanojević et 
al. (2016, p. 12) stress, “within this formal structure, which has been exposed to small, 
incremental changes, there are clear signs of major changes in power relations as well 
as in the logic and quality of the industrial relations system”. This logic and quality is 
best described in terms of competitive authoritarianism, where democratic pressures 
for social expenditures and more equal redistribution of produced wealth are 
prevented by legal barriers. 
5. Conclusion 
This contribution discusses the changing role of states in their national economies by 
focusing on the internationalisation of the Slovenian state and related transformations 
of Slovenian neo-corporatism. In a context of a comparatively shallow 
internationalisation of the Slovenian state and a relatively “autonomous” space for 
policy-making during the period of EU negotiations, the institutional infrastructure of 
Slovenian capitalism was shaped by strong organised labour that assured that the 
economic and political management of labour predominated the institutional 
hierarchy. With the rescaling of Slovenian state regulations in line with the European 
single market and Eurozone constraints, labour bargaining power and its institutional 
capacities to impact on policy-making over major macroeconomic decisions started 
to weaken even prior to the crisis. This trend accelerated in the post-2008 period and 
its “austeritarian” crisis management. Whereas the local population was pushed into 
a position of policy acceptance, the decision-making process increasingly took place 
between leading Slovene financial institutions and executive bodies, and the European 
Commission together with the ECB. In other words, while the structural weakness of 
the Slovenian economy and power struggles between various social forces had 
domestic roots, the Eurozone regime helped to consolidate the external dependency 
of the Slovenian economy and to weaken the wage-bargaining power of labour. 
This discussion contributes to the existing debate on the political economy of 
Slovene capitalism during the crisis in three ways. Firstly, differences in policy 
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responses have often been explained in terms of the cultural/ideological backgrounds 
of successive governments (Lindstrom 2015, Myant et al. 2013). According to this 
analysis, however, the policy agenda and the actual implementation of reform 
measures were also related to the strength of organised labour and its organisational 
capacities. Secondly, whereas the importance of external and internal constraints to 
the post-2008 policy shift has been acknowledged (Bohle–Greskovitz 2012, 
Stanojević et al. 2016), the “embeddedness” of Slovenian state regulations in the 
Eurozone regime and the consequent uneven restructuring of the capacities of various 
local social forces to influence decision-making process have been underestimated. 
Thirdly, when discussing the institutional transformation of the Slovenian economy 
in the post 2007/08 period, the analysis should go beyond the dichotomist 
understanding of institutional change in terms of continuity and change to integrate 
the question of power relations between social forces and institutions representing 
them. 
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